On 10 April 2024, the European Parliament narrowly approved the Pact on Migration and Asylum, aiming to address the EU’s fragmented asylum system. This pact’s origins trace back to the 2015 refugee crisis, which led to ongoing disputes among Member States, stricter asylum policies, reinstated border controls, and dissatisfaction over the uneven distribution of migration burdens. Despite high expectations during its four-year development, the pact has disappointed NGOs working in asylum matters, left-wing Social Democrats, and some traditional right-wing parties.

Despite its name, the Pact on Migration and Asylum deals only with irregular immigrants who claim asylum, not general migration issues. It does not address labor shortages, aging populations, or policies for attracting immigrants to specific sectors like agriculture, construction, and healthcare. It also excludes integration policies and processes for regularizing irregular immigrants. Overall migration policies remain the responsibility of individual Member States, although they must coordinate due to the Schengen area’s free movement.

The Pact on Migration and Asylum consists of five regulations spanning 2,000 pages, making it complex to summarize or read without prior knowledge. The regulations are interrelated and linked to the Schengen area’s movement rules, which are also being reformed. After two years of negotiations, Member States reached consensus on two regulations, approved unanimously in June 2022. The Screening regulation standardizes identity, security, and health checks at the EU’s external borders. EURODAC, the EU’s fingerprint database, will be upgraded to a biometric database shared online via the Entry Exit System (EES), tracking all arrivals and departures in the Schengen area to prevent ‘asylum shopping’ and monitor asylum seekers’ movements.

After agreeing on two regulations, talks stalled on the remaining three proposed by the Commission: the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation, the Common Asylum Procedure, and the Response to Asylum Crisis and Force Majeure Situations. These were finally agreed upon in the European Council meetings in June and December 2023, despite opposition from Poland and Hungary. The negotiations were marked by southern European countries demanding more solidarity, eastern countries (mainly Poland and Hungary) resisting proportional quotas for asylum seekers, and central and northern countries wanting to extend the responsibility of the country of entry. Ultimately, it was decided that the country of entry would be responsible for 20 months, or 12 months for those rescued at sea.

The Screening Regulation aims to prevent the entry of (1) economic migrants, (2) those posing security risks or providing false information, and (3) those from countries with low recognition rates. These people undergo a border procedure, and required to stay in specific facilities near the EU borders for up to 12 weeks until they are either allowed to enter the EU and apply for asylum or denied entry. This detainment prevents rejected asylum seekers from disappearing within the EU´s territory and aids in their potential expulsion. Expulsion is easier if the individual’s whereabouts are known, based on the idea that they have not fully entered the country. The threshold for a low recognition rate is set at 20%, with high acceptance (100%) for Afghans and Syrians, but low for Senegalese and Moroccans.

A key feature of the Common asylum procedure is the ability to return asylum seekers to a ‘safe third country’ if they have connections there. For example if the refugees have spent time in Serbia or Morocco, before arriving to the EU, they could be sent back there. The Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management introduces a flexible solidarity system where Member States can either accept their quota of asylum seekers, pay €20,000 per non-admitted asylum seeker, or invest in immigration projects, manage returns, or provide technical support. At least 30,000 people should be resettled annually from Mediterranean countries to others, based on population, GDP, and past irregular arrivals.

Navigating Complexities of the Pact

 In 2022 and 2023, the final talks to seal the pact took place in a different context from 2020, when the proposal was submitted during the pandemic. Post-pandemic, irregular migration and asylum seekers increased, with 4 million Ukrainians granted refuge in 2022. Western countries were overwhelmed by the high numbers of applicants, with 680,000 irregular arrivals in 2022 and 2023 combined, a total around a million asylum seekers by 2023. Housing tensions arose after accommodating Ukrainian refugees, and immigration was used as a political weapon (Poland-Belarus border, Ceuta). The political climate shifted towards restrictive asylum policies, with electoral gains by xenophobic parties and mainstream parties adopting stricter control. Many Member States tightened their asylum and migration policies.

In this context, the pact was agreed upon based on the shared objective of greater control over arrivals, resulting in fewer opportunities to request asylum at European Union`s external borders. NGOs and observers criticize the stricter procedures, which will increase the number of applicants rejected at the outset. However, the pact strengthens protection for minors, families with children, and particularly vulnerable immigrants.

The pact aims to regulate, harmonize, and make asylum management more predictable to avoid conflicts between Member States, focusing on establishing similar procedures and standards. It harmonizes border procedures and reception centre standards but leaves national differences in assistance, acceptance rates, and deportation likelihoods. The pact does not create a single refugee status valid throughout the EU. Despite these efforts, it does not address many current shortcomings in managing irregular immigration and asylum.

The return of failed asylum applicants remains problematic due to weak agreements with origin countries; only 20% are repatriated, leaving many in limbo. The pact suggests integrating immigration into EU foreign relations and trade agreements, enhancing anti-trafficking efforts, improving readmission cooperation, and facilitating legal migration through the EU Talent Partnerships.

Progress will hinge on negotiations with each country, with the pact’s foreign policy provisions serving mainly as guidelines. Efforts to combat human-trafficking networks are unlikely to succeed due to their decentralized structure. As long as there is demand, these networks will persist despite increased police activity. The “Talent Partnerships” are useful for legal immigration and migrant training but lack the capacity to handle the large numbers of migrants from African and Asian countries.

Implementing the pact requires funding for new border facilities and procedures. The EU Commission aims to raise €600 million annually by charging states €20,000 per unaccepted refugee from 30,000 to be resettled yearly. However, this is minor compared to the €8 billion spent by Germany in 2015 and Poland in 2022 on refugee care.

The pact emphasizes responsibility over solidarity, clearly defining each Member State’s duties in handling irregular arrivals. However, the complex system for distributing the burden of asylum seekers lacks clarity and predictability. It’s uncertain how solidarity will manifest or if the EU can enforce it, especially with resistant countries like Poland. The resettlement target of 30,000 people annually covers only 10% of irregular arrivals, indicating limited solidarity in distribution. The pact also lacks clear definitions for ‘situations of crisis and force majeure,’ which allow affected countries to suspend certain asylum and border-control standards and request additional support. The term ‘mass arrivals’ is mentioned but not quantified, and the Council must authorize any exceptional measures under the crisis regulation. The concept of ‘crisis’ now includes the use of migrants as political weapons. In 2021, Belarus orchestrated the arrival of migrants in Poland and Lithuania, while Morocco facilitated the entry of Moroccans into Ceuta to pressure Spain. Such ‘hybrid attacks’ may increase, using immigration to destabilize neighbouring countries.

Conclusion: Challenges and Prospects for Pact Implementation

The regulations of the pact will come into force in June 2026. Until then, the Commission will negotiate with Member States to ensure they build the necessary border infrastructure and establish administrative procedures for processing asylum claims. During this period, the Commission will also work to secure political commitment from all Member States, despite opposition from Poland, Hungary, and concerns from the German Länder (German Federal States). Germany, despite not having direct arrivals of irregular asylum seekers due to its geographic location, faces challenges as the highest recipient of refugees from other EU countries. This influx has strained local management systems, contributing to tensions within the Länder and influencing the rise of the far-right’s popularity. Mainstream parties have also adopted stricter stances in response.

German representatives often express frustration over the lack of solidarity within the EU, as the pact seems to primarily benefit states with external borders, particularly in Southern and Eastern Europe. The CDU, Germany’s main opposition party, plans to focus on externalisation, seeking agreements with non-EU countries to host asylum seekers while their claims are processed, similar to Italy’s agreement with Albania. Germany may pursue similar agreements with Eastern European countries aspiring to join the EU. These externalisation agreements are contentious within the EU’s asylum policy framework and may hinder the convergence processes and future EU membership of the countries involved. Implementing the pact is expected to face political and possibly legal challenges, given the current international climate which is largely unfriendly towards such measures.

Hungary holds the presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2024, followed by Poland and Denmark in 2025. Both Hungary and Poland oppose the pact, while Denmark, which has opted out of EU justice and interior policies since 1992, also holds highly restrictive positions on asylum. The current and these upcoming presidencies make it unlikely for any of these Member States to actively promote the pact, especially its less aligned parts, casting doubt on its full implementation by the summer of 2026. The European Parliament expected after the June elections is anticipated to take a more hardline stance on immigration, reducing potential political support for the current pact.

NGOs specializing in refugee and immigrant rights have strongly criticized the pact, suggesting legal challenges may arise against aspects like the ‘non-entry’ fiction in border procedures and the adequacy of legal assistance provided. Increasing instability in Africa, the Middle East, and Ukraine is expected to boost migration towards the EU, heightening political tensions within and between Member States over asylum management.

Without significant improvements in deportation rates through better EU relations with countries of origin, the structures outlined in the pact are likely to fail in curbing irregular immigration. If these challenges prevent the pact’s implementation, Member States may adopt even stricter policies individually, potentially restricting Schengen area terrestrial freedom of movement further (already 12 Member States conduct land border controls). There could also be a greater tendency to outsource asylum processing to non-EU countries. A failure of the pact would underscore the EU’s political vulnerabilities and its struggle to coordinate responses to shared challenges.